This paper provides an overview of the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the Indian economy. It identifies the channels through which the GFC has impacted the Indian economy and evaluates the stimulus packages that have been put in place by the government of India. Finally, the paper examines short run prospects for the Indian economy in light of the GFC and the economy's recent dynamism.
I.

Introduction
The on-going global financial crisis (GFC) has cast a shadow over the global economy with world output and trade forecasted (by the IMF) to shrink in 2009. This is the first time such contraction has taken place since the end of the Second World War and represents a major challenge for policymakers apart from the immense hardship it is inflicting on working households who are losing their jobs and/or their homes on an unprecedented scale and experiencing deep wealth loss.
There are some special characteristics of the current recession. Unlike recent episodes of recession this is not just a case of an asset bubble bursting with implications for some financial institutions and an accompanying contraction of demand which could be addressed by automatic stabilizers on the fiscal side and a monetary policy that cut interest rates. This recession is a far more complicated entity. First, there was an asset bubble caused by a glut of savings in the global economy (coming largely from China) and the US's inexhaustible appetite for debt. Thus the savings glut which led to low interest rates largely financed excessive US consumption -not investment. This led to a substantial hike in asset prices (particularly home prices), aided and abetted by the commodities boom following strong growth performance in emerging economiesparticularly India and China and the development of complex financial instruments, e.g., derivatives, largely unregulated that raised asset prices -particularly mortgage based loans -to high levels. The debt spiral that this resulted in has been well discussed in the literature -suffice it to say that when bad mortgage debt started being recalled (the so called subprime crisis) it was quickly realized that there was a general credit crisis following from the existence of vast sums of questionable (toxic) assets in the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions. As a result, the collateral backing of many credit advances started being questioned and credit froze. Despite aggressive rate cutting by central banks in all the major countries the cost of borrowing skyrocketed.
This led to a collapse of demand and rising unemployment -all in a vicious demand spiral. Appendix 1 to this paper briefly chronicles the development of the current crisis.
Thus, as distinct from most recessions in the recent past the current deep recession represents a combination of many factors. First, it began as a crisis of debt and of asset price inflation. Second, it represents a regulatory crisis. The explosion of complex (and unregulated) financial instruments in a high debt environment exacerbated the crisis of debt. Following immediately from this and, third, it represents a massive imbalance in the global economy and a credit crunch. Fourth it represents a collapse of demand and, following from that rising unemployment. Finally, the rising unemployment exacerbates the debt crisis as people are unable to pay off debts. This also completes a vicious cycle.
Hence, a number of factors are influencing the current downturn. Further, these factors reinforce each other and it would be necessary to address each of them if the global economy has to recover from its present malaise. A piecemeal approach is unlikely to work. A stimulus package consisting of enhanced government expenditure and tax breaks represents a boost to aggregate demand and will not work by itself. If bank balance sheets are still bedevilled with toxic assets the money handed out to people through the stimulus package will be deposited in banks. But if banks are not inclined to lend this money out the multiplier effect of the stimulus package will be frozen in its tracks.
Hence, it is important to underscore the fact that there exists a multiplicity of reasons for the current global financial crisis with some of these reasons having feedback effects on each other. In light with the Mundell-Tinbergen Assignment Principle we need to have at least as many independent policy tools as policy objectives. In this particular case, policy needs to work independently on: (i) stabilizing the balance sheets of banks to rid them of toxic assets, (ii) facilitating growth of credit by guaranteeing deposits and by lowering the cost of credit (interest rate and margins reduction), (iii) stimulating demand; (iv) buttressing social safety nets for the unemployed and making automatic stabilizers more efficient; (v) putting into place more comprehensive regulation of financial instruments and enhanced international cooperation in this area; and (vi) ensuring that global imbalances of the sort preceding the current crisis never happen again. This is a tall order but unless action is taken on all these fronts the global economy can run into another crisis albeit with a much larger level of debt. If global imbalances persist or if effective regulation of financial instruments is not forthcoming the global economy is at risk of facing another crisis in the not too distant future. At that time, however, the world economy will be saddled with a much larger debt due mainly to the many large bailout and stimulus packages. Hence, it is imperative that progress be made on all these fronts. However, some policies should, logically, precede others, e.g., banks should be stabilized before fiscal stimuli are put into place. reveal an economy that is still performing reasonably well, rather than of one that is slipping into deep recession. A key reason for this is the strong dynamism of the Indian economy, key elements of which we explore in the next section.
III. Key Drivers of Economic Growth in India
India's growth rate has been accelerating for the past 25 years or so. Hence, there is considerable momentum in the Indian economy. Contributing to this acceleration is a broad series of reforms including financial sector reforms, increased globalization and widening and deepening of product and financial markets. The impact of such reforms gets reflected in key indicators such as market capitalization of the stock market, the technology and transparency of transactions, the sets of instruments traded, balance sheets of financial institutions and the degree of openness of the economy. Concurrently a benign FDI policy framework has permitted greater tie-ups in high technology areas for production for domestic as well as external markets. I now list some key factors (in a growth accounting sense) that have led to the current surge in economic growth in India and have the potential to sustain or even accelerate this growth rate.
Productivity Growth
The higher GDP growth rate beginning in the 1980s has been accompanied by a sharp acceleration in total factor productivity growth (Table 2) . 
Improvements in Labour Supply
India's labour supply is undergoing fundamental changes. In 2000 the proportion of the Indian population in the working age group (15-64 age bracket) was 60.9 per cent. The UN's Population Division has projected that this ratio will surpass the proportion of Japanese in this age group by 2012 and climb to over 66 per cent in 30 years. At that time it is poised to overtake China's population in the same age group.
At the same time a quiet revolution is taking place in nutritional status in India with calorie and other macro and micro nutrient deficiency on the decline. According to the 5 There has been a debate of sorts about whether attitudinal changes in the government bureaucracy or actual policy changes are better explanations for the acceleration in economic growth in India. In a country with an autarkic trade regime and a highly centralized administrative structure, attitudinal changes may well be the hardest to make. Hence, both policy measures as well as attitudinal changes should be regarded as essential as well as complementary explanations for this surge in the rate of growth.
quality improvements in the India's labour force. Economic theory and international experience leads us to believe that this will lead to sharp rises in labour productivity and an upward shift in the trend long run rate of growth of the Indian economy.
Higher Savings and Investment for Enhanced Economic Growth
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Falling Fiscal deficits and rising public savings
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India's External Sector Performance
The recent acceleration in India's economic growth has been associated with greater economic integration with the global economy. India missed the first phase of trade liberalization in the post-War period but is has not done so this time around. Indian manufacturing tariffs are now low by world developing country standards: 12.5 per cent
and Indian anti-dumping appears to be slowing down. India is far less dependent on tariffs for government revenue but agricultural tariff reduction has not kept pace with industrial tariff liberalization. A necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be reversed would be agricultural protection cuts in developed countries. India's exports have surged 6 and India's export basket is geared towards high value added items such as engineering goods (Table 3) . India's imports have also been growing rapidly and are highly skewed towards petroleum products and capital goods (Table 4) . India's trade balance, although substantially in the red, has been covered by inflows from Non Resident Indians and software exports leading to more modest current account deficits. This along with substantial foreign exchange reserves ensures reasonable macroeconomic stability.
IV. Channels through with the GFC has impacted India
Against the background of section III there should be reasons to believe that India should be impacted, minimally, if at all by the GFC. However, there has been a significant impact, which necessitates an explanation.
D. Subbarao, Governor of RBI, in a speech 7 in February 2009 dealt at length on the issue. His argument is essentially as follows. There are at least two reasons why one should expect the GFC to have minimal impact on India. First, the Indian banking had no direct exposure to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Indeed, no Indian bank has had to be rescued -nor has there been any need for deposits guarantee. Second, India's growth, as argued above, is largely based on domestic consumption and domestic investment. External demand as measured by merchandise exports account for less than 15 per cent of India's GDP.
However, Subbarao argues, the Indian economy has globalized rapidly during the past few years. In terms of openness to international trade the ratio of exports plus imports to 
V. Conclusions
The short-run outlook for the Indian economy is unclear. Real GDP growth has shown strong signs of slipping. Even the most dynamic service sector has been facing a slowdown. Exports and industrial growth are down as is credit offtake. There is widespread optimism that the services and manufacturing sector will also record reasonable growth. The sharp fall in the rate of inflation 9 has provided room for more aggressive interest rate cuts by the Reserve Bank of India. India's banking system remains robust, although the burden of servicing the larger debt because of the stimulus packages will not be insignificant.
Furthermore, although equity markets have registered steep declines the wealth impact on domestic residents is limited since a large number of Indians do not participate in equity markets.
Assuming that the global economy starts picking up in 2009-10, which it shows some signs of doing, and provided developed countries do not resort to widespread protectionism, 10 the Indian economy should be in a good position to register a strong comeback. Given that the stimulus packages have already imposed a significant fiscal burden, the new central government would need to eschew undue populism, failing which high fiscal deficits could again restrict India's growth between potential as was the case in the mid to late 1990s. However, the chances of this happening are lower now.
The Indian economy has certainly grown in terms of sophistication and depth since the 1990s. On balance, there is reason to be guardedly optimistic about the Indian economy in the short run.
9 But food prices remain high. 10 However, this expectation may be belied. v) The guarantee cover under Credit Guarantee Scheme for micro and small enterprises on loans was increased from Rs 5 million to Rs 10 million with a guarantee cover of 50 per cent. In order to enhance flow of credit to micro enterprises, it was decided to increase the guarantee cover extended by Credit Guarantee Fund Trust to 85 per cent for credit facility upto Rs 0.5 million. This will benefit about 84 per cent of the total number of accounts accorded guarantee cover. vi) State Governments are facing constraints in financing expenditure because of slower revenue growth. To help maintain the momentum of expenditure at the state government level, states will be allowed to raise in the current financial year
